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THE PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICEt
Richard W. Wright*
Justice is the end of government.
It is the end of civil society.'
INTRODUCTION

I am very pleased to be participating in this Symposium in honor
of John Finnis, whose work displays an unusually deep, broad, and
detailed understanding of both morality and law and of the proper
relationship between them. In this Article, I attempt to follow in Finnis's footsteps by exploring the principles of justice that embody that
proper relationship.
There are significant differences of opinion as to the extent of
the actual relationship between morality and law in different societies.
Yet most people agree that the law should be morally sound, that
moral principles often do underlie the law, and that the moral principles that do underlie the law should be used by judges to interpret
and apply the law, at least in difficult cases. Moreover, it generally has
been assumed that the moral principles that do, or should, underlie
the law are principles ofjustice. Indeed, it has often been stated that
the sole purpose of law is, or should be, the implementation ofjustice.
What are the principles ofjustice? Although there are many references to justice in court opinions, few provide any detailed elaboration of the concept, and many seem conclusory in nature. Noting
this, some claim that justice is a question-begging concept which, beyond the formal justice notion of treating like cases alike, has no inherent substantive content and thus provides little or no guidance to
legislators, judges, jurors, or ordinary citizens. This claim is incorrect.
In both theory and everyday practice, the concept ofjustice has long
been thought to encompass not merely a formal equality (treating like
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cases alike), but also a substantive equality which requires giving each
person his or her "due"-what is his or hers as a matter of right-a
requirement that is usually understood to be in direct conflict with the
basic principles of aggregate social welfare theories such as utilitarian2
ism or its modem variant, economic efficiency.
The elaboration of this substantive equality and its implications
for morality, justice, and law form the core of the "natural law" (or
"natural right") theory of law, which goes back at least as far as Aristotle and has been most fully elaborated and ably defended in recent
3
times by Finnis. In his monographs Natural Law and NaturalRights
and Aquinas,4 Finnis provides a sophisticated elaboration and reformulation of the natural law theory of Thomas Aquinas, which itself is
an elaboration and reformulation of Aristotle's account. Finnis's exposition of the moral principles underpinning the concept of justice
makes evident the continuity and persistence of those principles in
the history of natural-law theorizing, from its roots in the classical theory of Aristotle to the medieval theory of Aquinas and the Enlightenment theories of Kant and Locke. 5 However, when Finnis turns to the
concept of justice, he runs into an apparent confusion in Aquinas's
theory that leads him to fail to distinguish clearly, as Aristotle did,
(a) between the dubious concept of "general justice" and the central
concept of "particular" justice, and (b) between the two substantive
divisions of particular justice: distributive justice and interactive justice. These distinctions, I believe, are crucial to a proper understand2

See, e.g, H.L.A. Hart, Problems of Philosophy of Law, in 6 Tm ENCYCLOPEDIA
274-75 (Paul Edwards ed., 1967).
The equal extension to all of the fundamental legal protections of person
and property is now generally regarded as an elementary requirement of the
morality of political institutions, and the denial of these protections to innocent persons, as a flagrant injustice....

OF

PHILosopHy 264,

[I] t seems clear that utilitarian principles alone cannot give any
account of the moral importance attached to equality and in general to the
notion of the just, as distinguished from an efficient, distribution as a means
of happiness.
Id.
3

JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS

(1980).

(1998).
5 Although Finnis makes few references to Kant's theory, and the few references
he makes usually refer to perceived weaknesses in Kant's theory, many of the arguments in his monograph on Aquinas-for example, on human freedom and dignity,
persons as "ends in themselves," the supreme principle of morality, and internal versus external freedom and the proper role of the state with respect to each-are very
similar in content and phraseology to those of Kant and were developed more explicitly, prominently, and systematically by Kant than by Aquinas (or by Aristotle).
4

JOHN FINNIS, AQUINAS: MORAL, PoLrrcAL, AND LEGAL THEORY
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ing of the concept ofjustice and to the proper resolution of concrete
issues of'justice and law.
To fully understand the concept of justice and its relationship to
law, it is necessary to understand the moral principles that underlie
the concept. So I will begin by briefly summarizing those moral principles, as they have been consistently elaborated in natural law theory
from Aristotle to Finnis, prior to focusing directly on the concept
itself.
I.

Tm BASIc MoRAL PREMISE: THE EQUAL DIGNITY OF PERSONS

Natural law theory is based on rational reflection on the nature,
conditions, and experience of being a human being in a world with
other such beings. As Finnis states,
By nature-that is, precisely as human persons-all human beings
are both free and equal. "Free" here refers both to the radical capacity for free choices, in which one is master of oneself, and to
one's freedom from any justified domination by other human per6
sons; to be free is to be-unlike a slave-an end in oneself.
Every individual member of the human species, as a rational being, has the "dignity of being a person."7 This dignity flows from the
consciousness of one's choosing and acting self as a self-determining
being,8 the "experience of the unity (including continuity) of [one's] be-

ing."9 As Finnis states,
The very form and lifelong act(uality) by which the matter of my bodily make-up is constituted the unified and active subject (me myself)
is a factor, a reality, which Aristotle calls psyche and Aquinas calls
soul {anima}.... [T]he essence and powers of the soul are given
to each individual complete (as wholly undeveloped, radical capacities) at the outset of his or her existence as such. This is the root of
the dignity we all have as human beings. 10
The fundamental moral significance of persons' status as free and
equal individuals, each with his or her own life to shape and live, is
also emphasized by Immanuel Kant. The foundation of Kant's moral
philosophy is the idea of free will or freedom, by which he did not
mean unrestricted pursuit of one's desires, but rather the oppositefully realizing one's humanity by subjecting one's actions to the universal moral law in order to free oneself from animal inclinations in
6 FINNIs, supra note 4, at
7 Id at 176.

8
9

10

170 (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 136, 240.

See id.at 41.
Id at 177.
Id. at 178-79 (footnotes omitted).
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opposition to that moral law.1 1 According to Kant, freedom, as well as
the moral personality constituted by its possession, is an inherent defining characteristic of each rational being. The possession of free
will or freedom is what gives each rational being moral worth-an absolute moral worth that is equal for all rational beings.
[M]an regarded as a person [rather than a mere animal], that is, as
the subject of a morally practical reason, is exalted above any price;
for as a person (homo noumenon) he is not to be valued merely as a

means to the ends of others or even to his own ends, but as an end
in himself, that is, he possesses a dignity (an absolute inner worth)
by which he exacts respect for himself from all other rational beings
in the world. He can measure himself with every other being of this
kind and value himself on a footing of equality with them.1 2
One determines one's character and individual identity as a person by the choices one makes and the actions one takes in pursuit of
the basic goods of human existence. These basic goods (which Finnis
lists as life, knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, friendship, practical
reasonableness, and religion) 1 3 "provide reason to act and lend point
to individual or group life as an open-ended whole."' 4 Being able to
and having to choose among the basic goods and the modes of partici11

See

IMMANUEL

KANT, THE METAPHYSICS

OF

MORALS

*213-14, 221-23, 225-27,

379-80 & n.*, 383, 394, 397, 405 (Mary Gregor trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991)
(1797).
12 Id. at *434-35.
13 See FrNNIs, supra note 3, at 90. Kant has a similar list of (morally obligatory)
ends, which are encompassed by one's own perfection (including cultivation of one's
physical, mental, moral, and social capacities) and the happiness of others (through
beneficence, charity, respect, friendship, etc.). He distinguishes these morally obligatory ends from one's own happiness, an end which one naturally has and hence for
which the concept of duty is inapplicable, and the perfection of others, an end which
others can only set and pursue for themselves. See KANT, supra note 11, at *385-88,
391-93, 418 n.*, 448-73. Thus, Finnis's description of Kantian ethics-that it "knows
the bonum rationis [good of practical reasonableness] but no other basic, intelligible
human good"-seems mistaken. FiN'is, supra note 4, at 138-39. The major difference between Kant on the one hand and Finnis (and Aquinas and Aristotle) on the
other is that, for Finnis, knowledge of the basic human goods is induced from human
experience, see id at 87-89, whereas Kant claims to deduce them from the supreme
principle of morality (the categorical imperative), see KANr, supranote 11, at *215-17,
225-26. However, Kant adds,
[A] metaphysics of morals cannot dispense with principles of application,
and we shall often have to take as our object the particular nature of man,
which is known only by experience, in order to show in it what can be inferred from universal moral principles. But this will in no way detract from
the purity of these principles or cast doubt on their a priori source.
Id. at *216-17.
14 FINNIs, supra note 4, at 41.
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pating in those goods "is the primary respect in which we can call
ourselves both free and responsible.' 5 This choice is the subject-matter of the basic good of practical reasonableness, which "both is a basic aspect of human well-being and concerns one's participation in all
the (other) basic aspects of human well-being. Hence its requirements concern fullness of well-being... [or] all-round flourishing"1 6
through one's conscious shaping and implementation of a coherent
and rational plan of life which takes proper account of each of the
basic goods.' 7 As Finnis observes,
[When one reaches the age of reason] one is immediately confronted with the rational necessity of deliberating, so far as one can,
about oneselfand about the direction, the integrating point, of one's
whole life, so that one treats oneself as an end in oneself to which
other things are related 8as quasi-means, and either does or fails to
do "what is in oneself."'
The ultimate good for any person is thus not mere pleasure "or
any other real or imagined internal feeling,"' 9 including happiness "in
the common, casual sense of that word."20 It rather is "beatitudo or
felicitas, happiness in the sense of fulfilment,"2' which is "a kind of synthesis of [the basic human goods]: satisfaction of all intelligent desires
and participation in all the basic human goods (whatever they are),
and thus a fulfilment which is complete and integral (integrating all
its elements and participants)."22

Aquinas's beatitudo, Finnis notes, is the same as Aristotle's
eudaimonia: a "flourishing" or "fulfilment" 23 of one's humanity accom15 FNmNas, supra note 3, at 100.
16 Id. at 102-03.
17 See id. at 88-89, 93-96, 103-05. Finnis identifies several methods or requirements of practical reasonableness, see id at 102-27, which, however, all seem to be
encompassed by the requirement of forming and pursuing a coherent and rational
life plan which properly takes into account all the basic goods and the multiplicity of

others with whom one co-exists. Finnis himself states that "all the requirements are
interrelated and capable of being regarded as aspects one of another," id. at 105, and
treats them as all being "aspects of the real basic good of freedom and reason," id at
126-27. In his monograph on Aquinas, he takes a more unitary approach to the good
of practical reasonableness, encapsulating it in the supreme principle of morality,
"love of neighbor as oneself." FINms, supra note 4, at 126; see also infra Part II.
18 FINmjs, supra note 4, at 41 n.68 (parentheticals omitted); see also ROBERT
NozicK, ANARcHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 48-51 (1974).

19
20
21
22
23

FINNIs, supra note 3, at 95.

IM
FImNs, supra note 4, at 85.
Id. at 85-86.
Id at 105.
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plished and constituted by the "integral directiveness of practical reason"24 to all the basic goods, which is "the organizing point of

individual and social choice, as something attainable (so far as is possible in one's circumstances) by one's own or our own actions as we are.
It is this: virtue in action."25 As with Finnis, Aquinas, and Kant, Aristotle identifies the morally significant distinguishing characteristic of a
human being as the capacity to live one's life in accord with a rational
principle. The highest good or happiness for a human being is activity in accord with a rational principle ("activity of soul") and in accord
with complete virtue in a complete life, 26 rather than "some plain and
obvious thing, like pleasure, wealth, or honour."27 Those who treat
pleasure or enjoyment as the good are "vulgar," and a life aimed at
such is "a life suitable to beasts." 28 Similarly, the acquisition of wealth
or property is not a good in itself, but rather is "undertaken under
compulsion" 29 as a necessary means to an end. It is properly aimed at
and limited by what is needed for a virtuous life, and it is justly censured when it is undertaken for its own sake, as a good in itself.30
II. THE COMMON GOOD AND THE SUPREME PRINCPLE OF MoRAL=ri
References to the "common good" or "common advantage" by
Aristotle or Aquinas are sometimes misinterpreted as referring to
some aggregative (for example utilitarian) or organic (for example
communitarian) conception of an overall social good. However, as
Finnis clearly explains, these phrases do not refer to any such aggregative or organic social good, but rather to the concurrent, interdependent, and harmonious flourishing or fulfilment of each individual in
the community, which can only be attained (given the nature and
conditions of human existence) through cooperation and coordina3
tion in communities. '
24
25

I at 107.
Id

26 See AmsTomE, NIcoMAcHaqE
ETHics bk. 1, ch. 7 (W.D. Ross & J.O. Urmson
trans.), in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARisroTLE 1729 (Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984);

see also id. bk. 1, ch. 9, at 1099b25-1100a5.

27 Id- bk. 1, ch. 2, at 1095a14-a23; see also id bk. 1, ch. 5, at 1095b22-b31; id. bk.
1, ch. 8, at 1099a12-a16.

28 Id bk. 1, ch. 5, at 1095b13-b22.
29
30

Id bk. 1, ch. 5, at 1096a6-a8.
See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS bk. 7, ch. 1, at 1323a36-1324al (B.Jowett trans.), in 2
THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1986 (Jonathon Barnes ed., 1984); see also id. bk.

1, ch. 10, at 1258a38-b8.
31

See FINNis, supra note 4, at 113-16, 120-22, 242-52; FrN'is, supra note 3, at

147-56, 168-69.
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Aristotle rejects Plato's conception of the state as an organic
unity. He instead views the state as a diverse plurality of free and
equal citizens, with the diverse plurality being necessary for the selfsufficiency (complete fulfilment or flourishing) of each citizen.3 2 Aristotle states,
[A] state is a community of families and aggregations of families in
well-being, for the sake of the perfect and self-sufficing life. Such a
community can only be established among those who live in the
same place and intermarry. Hence there arise in cities family connexions, brotherhoods, common sacrifices, amusements which draw
men together. But these are created by friendship, for to choose to
live together is friendship. The end of the state is the good life, and
these are the means towards it. And the state is the union of families and villages in a perfect and self-sufficing life, by which we mean
33
a happy and honourable life.

A person alone cannot be self-sufficient, not only because of individual needs and common interests, but also because "man is by nature a political [social] animal."3 4 It is only in the limited sense of the
necessity of the state for the complete or self-sufficing life of each of
its citizens that the state is "prior to the individual."3 5 The attainment
of each person's well-being (self-sufficiency) through community is
"certainly the chief end, both of individuals and of states."3 6
Since practical reasonableness is directed to the fullest possible
attainment of the good, and this good is a shared good for all human
beings, the directiveness of practical reasonableness "has no rational
stopping-place short of a universal common goo& the fulfilment of all
human persons," a directiveness which is expressed, Finnis states, in
the master principle of morality, "love of neighbour as oneself"3 7 This
principle is often restated as the golden rule, "[d] o unto others as you
32 See AlISToTE, supra note 30, bk. 2, ch. 2, at 1261a14-b15; id. bk. 7, ch. 8, at
1328b15-b22; see also Martha C. Nussbaum, Shame, Separateness, and Political Unity: Aristotle's Criticism ofPlato, in EssAYs ON ARiSTOTLE'S ETmICS 395, 395-97, 415-27 (Amdlie
0. Rorty ed., 1980) [hereinafter AisToTLE's ETmICS].
33 ARi.sToT, supra note 30, bk. 3, ch. 9, at 1280b33-1281a4; see also id. bk. 7, ch.
2, at 1324a22-a23 ("Now it is evident that that form of government is best in which
every man, whoever he is, can act best and live happily."); id. bk. 7, ch. 9, at
1329a21-a24 ("[A] city is not to be termed happy in regard to a portion of the citizens, but in regard to them all.").
34 AsroTL, supra note 30, bk. 1, ch. 2, at 1253a2-a3; see AIsToTLE, supra note
26, bk. 9, ch. 9, at 1169b17-b21.
35 ARToT, supra note 30, bk. 1, ch. 2, at 1253a25-a26.
36 Id. bk. 3, ch. 6, at 1278b24-b25; see also id. bk. 1, ch. 2, at 1252b28-1253a32.
37 Fnis, supra note 4, at 132 (emphasis in original); see also id. at 126-29.
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would have them do unto you," 38 which is found in various versions in
many religions and moral theories.39 It is the "architectronic" 40 moral
principle from which, keeping in mind the basic human goods, all
41
other moral principles can be inferred or deduced.
As Finnis observes, the "love of neighbor as oneself" principle
functions in Aquinas's ethics as does the supreme principle of morality-the "categorical imperative"-in Kant's ethics. 4 2 The categorical
imperative is, Kant states, "Act only according to that maxim by which
you can at the same time will that it should become a universal
[moral] law,"'43 which Kant reformulates as "Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an
38 Id. at 128, 139-40.
39 I am indebted to Alexander Tsesis for the following examples. In Judaism the
earliest formulation of this rule is found in Leviticus 19:18: "Love thy neighbor as
thyself, I am the Lord." The renowned first century rabbi Hillel, when asked by a
potential convert to explain the Torah while he stood on one foot, replied, "What is
hateful to you, do not to your neighbor: that is the whole Torah, while the rest is
commentary thereof; go and learn it." BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Shabbath 31a, translated
in THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD 140 (I. Epstein ed. & trans., 1987). Jesus stated,
"Whatever you would want people to do to you, so do unto them likewise; this is the
law and the prophets." Matthew 7:12. Many scholars believe Confucius's teaching was
along the same lines. "Tzu-kung asked, 'Is there one word which can serve as the
guiding principle for conduct throughout life?' Confucius said, 'It is the word altruism (shu). Do not do to others what you do not want them to do to you.'" Analects
15:23, in A SOURCE BOOK IN CHINESE PHILOSOPHY 44 (Wing-tsit Chan ed. & trans.,
1963) [hereinafter CHINESE PHILOSOPHY]. "Confucius said, '[Tseng Tzu], there is one
thread that runs through my doctrines. . .

.'

After Confucius had left, the disciples

asked [Tseng Tzu], 'What did he mean?' Tseng Tzu replied, 'The Way of our Master
is none other than conscientiousness (chung) and altruism (shu).'" Analects 4:15, in
CHINESE PHILOSOPHY, supra, at 27. Professor Chan explains the significance of this
passage as follows: "All agree ...

on the meanings of chung and shu ....

[C]hung

means the full development of one's [originally good] mind and shu means the extension of that mind to others ....

Here is the positive version of the Confucian

golden rule." Id. at 27 (commenting on Analects 4:15); see generally H.T.D. ROST,
GOLDEN RULE: A UNIVERSAL ETHIC (1986).
40

41
42

THE

FINNIs, supra note 4, at 128.

See idi. at 127-28, 138-39.
See id. at 131 n.g. Finnis notes further,
[The categorical imperative functions] in content though not in literary
form like the "first moral principle" in the moral theory outlined by Grisez
[and himself]: "In voluntarily acting for human goods and avoiding what is
opposed to them, one ought to choose and otherwise will those and only
those possibilities whose willing is compatible with a will towards integral
human fulfilment."
Id. (quoting Grisez).
43 IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS *421 (Lewis
White Beck trans., MacMillan 1990) (1784).
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end and never as a means only."4 4 Kant himself noted the categorical
imperative's similarity to the golden rule. However, Kant argued, the
categorical imperative is both broader in scope and more demanding
than the golden rule. It is morally wrong under the categorical imperative to fail to respect the absolute moral worth of anyone, including
yourself, as a self-determining rational being, regardless of whether
you would allow others to treat you without proper respect.
[The golden rule] is only derived from the [categorical imperative]
and is restricted by various limitations. It cannot be a universal law,
because it contains the ground neither of duties to one's self nor of
the benevolent duties to others (for many a man would gladly consent that others should not benefit him, provided only that he
might be excused from showing benevolence to them).45
Finnis acknowledges that the "love of neighbor as self' principle
and its variant, the golden rule, apply "preeminently" to one's moral
obligations to others rather than to oneself (especially if read literally).46 However, he notes, there clearly are moral duties to oneself.47
He seems to argue that these moral duties to onself can be derived
from the neighbor principle through a sufficiently deep understanding of the (common) good of others:
[T]o love one's neighbour is to will the neighbour's good-and not
just this or that good, but good somehow integrally; and nothing
inconsistent with a harmonious whole which includes one's own
good (likewise integrated in itself and with others' good). Thus the
love-of-neighbour principle tends to unify one's goals. 48
Whether understood as "love of neighbor as oneself," the golden
rule, or Kant's categorical imperative, the supreme principle of morality in natural law theory, in both its conception of human good and its
conception of the equality of persons, stands in direct opposition to

44 Mdat *429. In yet another formulation, Kant states, "The rational being must
regard himself always as legislative in a realm of ends possible through the freedom of
the will, whether he belongs to it as member or as sovereign." It. at *434; see also id. at
*432-34. Compare Kant's second formulation with Finnis's argument that preserving
and promoting the common good by refusing to sacrifice the innocent for the
"greater good" of others "makes sense only if the common good is taken to include
exceptionless respect for the good-and the rights-of all the members of the community considered one by one as ends in themselves." FINNIs, supra note 4, at 168 n.160
(second emphasis added).
45 KANT, supra note 43, at *430 n.14; see also KANT, supranote 11, at *450-51.
46 See FINNIs, supra note 4, at 127.
47 See id. at 126 n.114, 138 n.30.
48 Id. at 127.
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the supreme principle of morality in utilitarianism, which was given its
most explicit expression by Jeremy Bentham.
Bentham's principle of utility, or "greatest happiness," mandates
actions which produce the greatest total utility (happiness understood
as pleasure or preference-satisfaction) for the citizenry in the aggregate. 49 The principle was first suggested to him when he read the
slogan, "the greatest happiness of the greatest number,"50 a slogan
which was sometimes used by him and is still sometimes used by
others to describe the principle of utility.5 1 However, the principle of
utility focuses solely on "the greatest happiness"-maximizing the total utility for the citizenry in the aggregate-rather than focusing also
or instead on maximizing the distribution of that utility to "the greatest number." Indeed, simultaneously maximizing both the total sum
and the distribution of utility is logically impossible. 52 There is no
independent weight given in the utilitarian theory to the distribution
of happiness (or wealth or power) or to the promotion of individuals'
equal freedom. On the contrary, each individual's freedom and interests are subordinated to the maximization of the total utility of the
citizenry in the aggregate.
As Bentham's successor in the utilitarian school, John Stuart Mill,
emphasized, " [ T] he happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of
what is right in conduct, is not the agent's own happiness, but that of
all concerned. As between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and
benevolent spectator."5 s In the sentences which immediately follow
this passage, Mill asserts, "In the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth, we
read the complete spirit of the ethics of utility. 'To do as you would
be done by,' and 'to love your neighbor as yourself,' constitute the
49

SeeJEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEG-

ISLATION 15 (London, MacMillan

1876) (1789).

50 Mary Wamock, Introductionto JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM, ON LIBERTY,
ESSAY ON BENTHAM 7 (Mary Warnock ed., 1962).
51 See, e.g., BENTHAM, supra note 49, at 17 n.1;JEFmE G. MuRPHY &JULEs L. CoLEMAN, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TOJURISPRUDENCE 72, 74 (rev. ed. 1990).
52 See WILL KYMLICKA, CONTEMPORARY POLMCAL PHILOSOPHY. AN INTRODUCTION
47 n.1 (1990). Kymlicka continues,
It is impossible for any theory to contain a double maxim, and any attempt
to implement it quickly leads to an impasse (e.g., if the two possible distributions are 10: 10:10 and 20: 20: 0, then we cannot produce both the greatest
happiness and the happiness of the greatest number).

Id.;
see also FINNiS, supra note 3, at 116.
53

JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM,

in 10

COLLECTED WORKS OF JOHN STUART

MILL 218 (J.M. Robson ed., University of Toronto Press 1963) (1861).
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ideal perfection of utilitarian morality."54 This assertion is based on
the erroneous assumption that to love your neighbor as yourself, or to
do unto others as you would have them do unto you, would require
you in everything you think or do to weigh the interests of each and
every other person equally with one's own interests or the interests of
one's family, friends, or groups. However, as Finnis and Kant note,
thought and action guided by such complete impartiality of interest
would lead to complete self-abnegation and to the destruction of personhood, rather than to its complete fulfilment, and thus is not a principle that any rational person would adopt as the supreme principle of
morality.55 It is an implausible interpretation of the golden rule.
The conception of equality in utilitarianism is quite different
from the equal freedom norm that underlies natural law theory. In
utilitarianism, each individual counts equally methodologically only,
as an equal and fungible addend in the calculation of the aggregate
sum. 5 6 Any individual's freedom or interests can and should be sacri-

ficed whenever doing so would produce a greater total of aggregate
happiness for society as a whole. It is not permissible to prefer one's
own interests or projects, or those of one's family members or friends,
over those of any other person except to the extent that doing so
would produce a greater total happiness for the citizenry in the aggregate. Utilitarians thus reject the idea of individual autonomy or
rights, at least insofar as those rights are understood (as they usually
are) as being independent of or in conflict with the principle of utility. Bentham was quite dismissive of the idea of rights, especially al54 Id
55 See, e.g., KANT, supra note 11, at *393 ("[A] maxim of promoting others' happiness at the sacrifice of one's own happiness, one's true needs, would conflict with
itself if it were made a universal law."); see also id. at *451-52. In his initial discussion
of the golden rule, Finnis ties it to the principle of impartiality between persons and
to the perspective of the ideal neutral observer or spectator, and he equates the impartiality principle with the often-cited moral requirement that one's moral judgments be universalizable. See FINNIs, supranote 3, at 107-08. However, as Kant notes,
the requirement that one's moral judgments be universalizable, which is fundamental
in the golden rule and Kant's categorical imperative, is distinct from and indeed incompatible with the requirement of complete impartiality of interest between persons
that constitutes the principle of utility. As Finnis recognizes, in order to be able to
lead one's own life, it is often necessary to be able, in private decisions concerning
one's own commitments and the allocation of one's own resources, to prefer one's
own interests and the interests of one's family, friends, and groups over the interests
of others. See id.
at 107-08, 112-14, 144-45, 304; FmNNis, supra note 4, at 117.
56 See MIL, supranote 53, at 257 ("[O]ne person's happiness, supposed equal in
degree (with the proper allowance made for kind), is counted exactly as much as
another's."); id. at 258 ("[T]he truths ...of arithmetic are applicable to the valuation
of happiness, as of all other measurable quantities.").
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leged natural rights. 57 Mill, however, recognized the powerful appeal

of the related concepts ofjustice and right and attempted to integrate
them into the utilitarian theory:
The interest involved is that of security, to every one's feelings the
most vital of all interests.... [N] othing but the gratification of the
instant could be of any worth to us, if we could be deprived of everything the next instant by whoever was momentarily stronger than
ourselves.... Our notion, therefore, of the claim we have on our
fellow creatures to join in making safe for us the very groundwork of
our existence gathers feelings around it so much more intense than
those concerned in any of the more common cases of utility that the
difference in degree (as is often the case in psychology) becomes a
real difference in kind. The claim assumes that character of absoluteness, that apparent infinity, and incommensurability with all
other considerations, which constitute the distinction between the
feeling of right and wrong and that of ordinary expediency [utility]
58
and inexpediency.
Utilitarians since Mill have made similar "rule-utilitarian" arguments in an attempt to reconcile utilitarianism with the natural law
principles of equal dignity, equal freedom, rights, and justice. They
argue that the net benefits of any particular intrusion on individuals'
autonomy or rights considered in isolation, taking into account the
happiness or interests only of the parties directly affected, would be
outweighed by the widespread social insecurity and anxiety that would
result if such intrusions were generally permitted, and thus would be
contrary to the principle of utility. However, these arguments give the
principles of autonomy, freedom, right, and justice a contingent and
derivative status which fails to convey their true sense or force. Moreover, under these arguments, the "autonomy" and "rights" of individuals still may be sacrificed if the total benefits exceed the total
disutility-for example, if the intrusions on autonomy and rights
(such as slavery or racial discrimination) are limited to an easily identifiable minority (such as blacks), so that the majority which benefits
from such intrusions need not worry about also being subjected to
such treatment. 59
In sum, utilitarianism (and its modem variant, economic efficiency theory) are completely at odds with the moral premises, princi57

See

BENTHAM,

supra note 49, at 1-7; Jeremy Bentham, AnarchicalFallacies, in

NONSENSE UPON STILTS: BENTHAM, BURKE AND MARX ON THE RIGHTS OF MAN

53 (Jer-

emy Waldron ed., 1987).
58 MILL, supra note 53, at 251.
59 See, e.g., FirNis, supranote 3, at 116; KYMLICKA, supranote 52, at 18-44; Muiu'H
& COLEMAN, supra note 51, at 72-75, 80-81; Hart, supra note 2.
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pies, and implications of natural law theory. The moral good in
natural law theory is the full realization of one's humanity as a free
and equal being, while the moral good in utilitarianism is pleasure or
preference-satisfaction, and the moral good in the economic-efficiency theory is resource wealth as measured by one's willingness and
ability to pay for those resources. 60 The equal freedom theory focuses
on the promotion of each person's equal freedom to pursue a morally
meaningful life. It thus places primary emphasis on the equal distribution of the good. The utilitarian efficiency theories, on the other
hand, focus solely on maximizing the total sum of the good (pleasure,
preference-satisfaction, or wealth). There is no independent concern
with how that total sum is distributed among individuals.
III. jusTcE AND LAw

As noted above, under natural law theory the sole purpose of the
state, and thus of politics and law, is the attainment of the common
good-the human flourishing or fulfilment of each person in the
community.6 ' The conditions which are properly specifiable by law
62
for the attainment of this common good are the principles ofjustice.
What are these conditions-that is, what is the proper scope and
content of the principles ofjustice? It is at this point that I believe a
confusion or uncertainty appears in Finnis's elaboration of natural law
theory, a confusion or uncertainty which he inherits from Aquinas
and is ultimately traceable to Aristotle's loose and inconsistent use of
terminology in his original elaboration of the concept of justice. In
the remainder of this Article, I explore and attempt to cut through
the sources of this confusion. In this Part, I focus on the scope or
60
See, e.g., RICHAR A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 8-9 (4th ed. 1992).
For further discussion of the inadequacy of the utilitarian conception of the good, see

FINNIs, supra note 3, at 95-97, 114, KYMLICaA, supranote 52, at 12-18, and MURPHY &
CoLEMAN, supra note 51, at 75-79.
61 See AISToTL, supra note 30, bk. 1, ch. 1, at 1252al-a6; id. bk. 1, ch. 2, at
1252b28-b30; id. bk. 3, ch. 9, at 1280a31-b13; FNmNs, supra note 4, at 114-15, 132; see
also supra text accompanying notes 32-36.
62 See AiSTOThE, supra note 30, bk. 3, ch. 6, at 127 9a17-a19 ("[G]overnments
which have a regard for the common interest are constituted in accordance with strict
principles ofjustice ... ."); id. bk. 3, ch. 12, at 1282b14-b16 ("[The] greatest good" is
the end of political science, "of which the good isjustice, in other words, the common
interest."); FrNNis, supra note 4, at 132-33; FINmIs, supra note 3, at 164-66; KANT,
supranote 11, at *318 ("By the well-being of a state is understood... that condition in
which its constitution conforms most fully to principles of Right [justice); it is that
condition which reason, by a categoricalimperative, makes it obligatory for us to strive
after.").
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domain of justice. In the next Part, I discuss the content of the substantive principles of justice.
From Aristotle to the present time, the concept ofjustice has generally been understood, in its central or focal sense, as consisting of
(a) equality or fairness (b) in interpersonal relations (c) that are
properly subject to regulation through legal rights and duties. 63 Aristotle emphasizes that justice pertains to our relations with others. 64
He distinguishes and then conjoins the other two elements-equality
and (rightful) law-that are encompassed by the concept of justice:
Let us then ascertain the different ways in which a man may be said
to be unjust. Both the lawless man and the grasping and unequal
man are thought to be unjust, so that evidently both the law-abiding
and the equal man will be just. The just, then, is 65the lawful and the
equal, the unjust the unlawful and the unequal.
Several ambiguities are apparent in this passage, which Aristotle
himself recognizes. Most obviously, is the just the lawful, the equal, or
only that which is both lawful and equal? The question is the perennial one of the nature of the relationship between law and morality, or
more specifically between law and justice interpreted as the equal or
equitable. Are law and justice the same or distinct, and if they are the
same, in which direction does the identity run: Is whatever is lawful
also just, or is something lawful only if it is just?
Much of Aristotle's discussion of this issue employs confusing and
inconsistent terminology. Recognizing the strong association between
the concepts of law and justice (which, he notes, leads to the Greek
word forjustice, dikaion, having the sense of either or both lawful and
equal66 ), Aristotle treats as "legally just" or "politically just" whatever is
part of the positive law of the community. He distinguishes the legally
63 The concept ofjustice is narrower than the concept of fairness with which it is
sometimes confused. While a broad array of actions and situations are said to be
unfair, it is not common to describe them as unjust unless they also involve the other
two elements listed in the text. Finnis notes some especially broad, metaphorical uses
of the word "justice," such as when one speaks of "doing oneselfjustice" by actually
doing as one is capable of doing. FiNNis, supra note 3, at 161. In the same vein, we
sometimes speak of "doing justice to a meal"-that is, consuming and enjoying it as it
deserves, given its merit as a meal. These metaphorical uses of the term obviously fall
outside the central meaning ofjustice.
64 See AlsToTLE, supra note 26, bk. 5, ch. 1, at l129b27-1130a13.
65 Id. bk. 5, ch. 1, at 1129a31-b2.
66 See supra text accompanying note 65. Aristotle describes equity as a form of
justice which is "better than one kind of justice"-the "legal justice" of the written
law-since it resorts directly to the fundamental principles of natural justice as "a
correction of legal justice" where the latter is defective owing to its generality. ARisTOTmE, supra note 26, bk. 5, ch. 10, at 1137b6-b27; see also ARSOTLE, RHETORIC bk. 1,
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or politically just from what is "justwithout qualification" 67 -what is
"naturally" or morallyjust. In other passages, he makes the same distinction using different terminology-for example, "general [natural]
law" versus "special [positive] law," or "universal [natural] law" versus
"particular [positive] law."6 8 Moreover, he sometimes uses "legaljustice" in an even narrower sense, as referring to those details of the
positive law which are left open by the general principles of natural
law:
Of political justice, part is natural, part legal,-natural, that which
everywhere has the same force and does not exist by people's thinking this or that; legal, that which is originally indifferent, but when
it has been laid down is not indifferent-e.g., that a prisoner's ransom shall be a mina, or that a goat and not two sheep shall be sacrificed, and again all the laws that are passed for particular cases. 6 9
Thus, despite his use of loose and inconsistent terminology, Aristotle seems to clearly distinguish positive law ("legal justice") from morality and justice (natural justice or natural law). He explicitly
declares that there may be unjust laws as well as just laws, depending
on the particular government. 70 Law is truly or "naturally" just (equitable), rather than merely "legally" just (lawful), only insofar as it is
"rightly framed":
[A]l1 lawful acts are in a sensejust acts, for the acts laid down by the
legislative art are lawfu and each of these, we say, is just.... [The
law] command[s] some acts and forbid[s] others; and the rightlyframed law does this rightly, and the hastily conceived one less
71
well.
However, the relationship between law, morality, and justice is
thrown into even deeper confusion by Aristotle's use of the words
"lawful" and "equal" to distinguish between what he refers to as the
ch. 13, at 1374a25-b23 (W. Rhys Roberts trans.), in 2 THE COMPLETE WoRs OF ARIsTOTLE 2152 (Jonathon Barnes ed., 1984).
67 AisTomE, supra note 26, bk. 5, ch. 6, at 1134a25-a26.
68 AilsToTE, supra note 66, bk. 1, ch. 10, at 1368b7-b9 (distinguishing between
"general law"--"all those unwritten principles which are supposed to be acknowledged everywhere"-and "special law"--"that written law which regulates the life of a
particular community"); id. bk. 1, ch. 13, at 1373bl-b9 (distinguishing between "universal law"-"the law of nature" or "natural justice"-and "particular law"-"that
which each community lays down and applies to its own members: this is partly written and partly unwritten").
69 ArsTOTrE, supranote 26, bk. 5, ch. 7, at 1134b18-b22; cf. FNNrS, supra note 4,
at 266-69 (discussing Aquinas's treatment of this distinction and the related concept
of determinatio).
70 See Amsm,
supra note 30, bk. 3, ch. 11, at 1282bl-b12.
71 AusromE, supra note 26, bk. 5, ch. 1, at 1129bl3--b26 (emphasis added).
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"wide" and "particular" senses of justice, respectively. Aristotle
equates justice in the sense of "lawful" with complete virtue as manifested in our relations with others, which he calls 'justice in the wide
sense." 72 To begin to make sense of this highly unusual use of the
words 'justice" and "lawful," one must realize that, unlike later natural
law theorists, Aristotle thought that the law could and should be used
not only to secure the external conditions necessary for the attainment of the common good, but also, through legally mandated habituation to morally proper conduct, 73 to secure each person's internal
virtuous character or disposition toward the common good:
[T]he laws in their enactments on all subjects aim at the common
advantage ... so that in one sense we call those acts just that tend to
produce and preserve happiness and its components for the political society. And the law bids us to do both the acts of a brave
man.., and those of a temperate man ... and similarly with regard
to the other excellences and forms of wickedness; commanding
some acts [the virtuous ones] and forbidding others [the vicious
ones]; and the rightly-framed law does this rightly, and the hastily
conceived one less well.
This form ofjustice, then, is complete excellence [virtue]-not
absolutely, but in relation to others.... And it is complete excellence in its fullest sense, because it is the actual exercise of complete
excellence. It is complete because he who possesses it can exercise
his excellence towards others too and not merely by himself ....
Justice in this sense, then, is not part of excellence but excellence
entire, nor is the contrary injustice a part of vice but vice entire.
What the difference is between excellence and justice in this sense
is plain from what we have said; they are the same but being them is
not the same; what, as a relation to others, is justice is, as a certain
74
kind of state without qualification, excellence.
In sum, according to Aristotle, if the positive law of a community
is "rightly framed," it is directed toward attaining each person's completely virtuous disposition in his or her relations with others, so that a
person who is "lawful" or "law-abiding" will be completely virtuous.
The end of law being justice, we can then equate the attainment of
72

Id. bk. 5, ch. 2, at 1130b6-b21.

73

See id. bk. 10, ch. 9, at 1179b20-1180a24.

74 Id. bk. 5, ch. 1, at 1129b14-1130a14; see also id. bk. 1, ch. 13, at 1102a7-alO
("The true student of politics ...wishes to make his fellow citizens good and obedient
to the laws."); id. bk. 5, ch. 2, at 1130b22-b25 ("[Piractically the majority of the acts
commanded by the law are those which are prescribed from the point of view of
excellence taken as a whole [rather than from the point of view of 'particular' justice]; for the law bids us practise every excellence and forbids us to practise any
vice."); ARsIroTLE, supra note 30, bk. 3, ch. 9, at 1280a31-b14.
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such complete virtue (through law) with what Aristotle calls 'justice in
its wide sense."
Aristotle distinguishes 'justice" in the wide sense of complete virtue from "particular" justice, which he initially describes as a specific
("particular") virtue, one of the many virtues encompassed by the
wide sense of "justice." He identifies the just person as being "equal"
and the unjust person as being "grasping and unequal." 75 Note once
again Aristotle's loose and ambiguous phrasing. In one sense, every
virtue involves behaving equally or equitably, since Aristotle conceives
of each virtue as a disposition, in one's passions and actions, to choose
the "equal," "intermediate," or "mean" (Aristotle uses these terms interchangeably) between excess and deficiency in pursuit of various
goods or ends. 76 In a narrower sense, appropriate to justice as a distinct ("particular") virtue, the "equal" is the intermediate between being "grasping" (claiming too much) and "yielding" (claiming too
little) with respect to those instrumental goods "with which prosperity
and adversity have to do." 77 The "grasping" person is disposed to take
what belongs to others, while the "yielding" person is disposed to allow others to take what belongs to her (without her consent).78 Aristotle explains,
There is... another kind of injustice which is a part of injustice in
the wide sense .... [T] he force of both lies in a relation to others

but the [particular sense] is concerned with honour or money or
safety-or that which includes all of these, if we had a single name
for it-and its motive is the pleasure that arises from gain; while the
[wide sense] is concerned with all the objects [ends] with which the
good man is concerned. 79
75 See supra text accompanying note 65.
76 See ARiSToTE, supra note 26, bk. 2, ch. 5, at 1106a3-a6; id. bk. 2, ch. 6, at
1106a25-1107a8.
77 Id. bk. 5, ch. 1, at 1129b3-b4. The "being yielding" conception of deficiency is
not explicit in Aristotle's account of particular justice, perhaps because being yielding-unlike being grasping-is not unjust, since one cannot be unjust to oneself. See
Richard W. Wright, Substantive CorrectiveJustice,77 Iowa L. REV. 625, 690-91 (1992).
78 The virtue ofjustice focuses on one's dealings with others' persons or instrumental goods, while the virtue of liberality focuses on one's dealings with one's own
instrumental goods. Compare AlusromE, supra note 66, bk. 1, ch. 9, at 1366b8-bl1
("Justice is the excellence through which everybody enjoys his own possessions in accordance with the law; its opposite is injustice, through which men enjoy the possessions of others in defiance of the law."), with AIsroTa, supranote 26, bk. 4, ch. 1, at
1119b22-1120a18 (stating that prodigality and meanness are the excess and deficiency, respectively, and liberality is the virtuous mean in one's disposition to share
one's resources or wealth with others).
79 ARIsTOTLE, supra note 26, bk. 5, ch. 2, at 1130a21-b5.
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Given his assumption that all of morality (as it relates to others) is
a proper subject of positive law, Aristotle's wide sense of 'Justice" includes all of the essential elements of the concept of justice that we
identified above: (a) equality or fairness (b) in interpersonal relations
(c) that are properly subject to regulation through legal rights and
duties. Nevertheless, the wide sense of 'Justice" likely was a linguistic
stretch even in Aristotle's time. After briefly introducing it in his Ethics, Aristotle quickly sets it aside 80 and thereafter focuses in both the
Ethics and the Politics on the narrower, "particular" sense of justice.8 '
Later natural law theorists recognize that treating virtue-one's
internal disposition to choose morally proper ends-as subject to legal regulation or enforcement is inconsistent with the foundational
premise of each person's basic dignity as a free and equal, self-determining, rational being.8 2 Finnis insightfully discusses Aquinas's divergence from Aristotle on this issue. He persuasively argues that,
despite statements by Aquinas which might easily be interpreted otherwise, Aquinas does not regard persons' attainment of complete virtue as a proper subject of law. Rather, Aquinas limits the role of the
state and law to the regulation of external acts which might affect the
"peaceful condition needed to get the benefits {utilitas} of social life
and avoid the burdens of contention" 8 3-that is, which implicate justice in the (particular) sense of rightful claims to personal security
80 See id. bk. 5, ch. 2, at 1130b18-b21.
81 Note, for example, Aristotle's references to the substantive criteria of "particular" justice- "proportional" and "arithmetic" equality-in the following passage:
[P]oliticaljusfce... is found among men who share their life with a view to
self-sufficiency, men who are free and either proportionately or arithmetically equal, so that between those who do not fulfil this condition there is no
political justice but justice in a special sense and by analogy. Forjustice exists only between men whose mutual relations are governed by law; and law
exists for men between whom there is injustice; for legal justice is the discrimination of the just and the unjust.
kL bk. 5, ch. 6, at 1134a26-a32. The substantive criteria of "proportional" and "arithmetic" equality are discussed in Part IV.
82 See FnNis, supra note 4, at 239-42, 247-52. Acknowledging that Aquinas's articulation of this fundamental point is "not as clear as we may wish," Finnis adds that
"[w]hen Kant and Mill announce positions similar to Aquinas', their attemptedjustifications are, at bottom, at least as sketchy." Id at 239. Here especially it seems to me
that Finnis slights Kant's contributions. This point lies at the heart of Kant's moral
philosophy and is argued by him fully, forcefully, repeatedly, and consistently. See
Wright, supranote 77, at 647-61; see also supra text accompanying notes 11-12, 42-45;
infra text accompanying notes 84-94, 109.
83 FNNis, supra note 4, at 227; see also iU. at 221-28; id. at 230-31 (equating disturbing others' peace with violations ofjustice). However, Finnis defends legally mandated habituation to the "justice-related" virtues:
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and instrumental goods rather than "justice"in the wide sense of complete virtue.
Kant is much more explicit, emphatic, and consistent on this fundamental point. In the elaboration of his moral philosophy, he distinguishes between a doctrine of virtue (ethics) and a doctrine of Right
(justice). The doctrine of virtue focuses on the internal aspect of the
exercise of freedom-one's shaping and living one's life by choosing
and acting in accordance with the proper ends. The doctrine of
Right, on the other hand, focuses on the external aspect of the exercise of freedom-the constraints on action required for persons' mutual practical exercise of their freedom in the external world. It
specifies which moral obligations are also legal obligations, enforceable through coercion by others. 84 The concept of Right follows, Kant
notes, from the idea of freedom:
[I]f a certain use of freedom is itself a hindrance to freedom in
accordance with universal laws (i.e., wrong), coercion that is opposed to this (as a hindering of a hindrance to freedom) is consistent
85
with freedom in accordance with universal laws, that is, it is right.

Each person has the right, indeed the ethical duty, to assert her
moral worth in interactions with others by, among other things, resisting nonrightful coercion by those others. This right is the only
innate right that each person originally has due to her equal dignity as
a rational being: "Freedom (independence from being constrained by
another's choice).*86 Inherent in this innate right is the authorization
to use coercion against another to resist or prevent nonrightful aggression by that other against one's person or property. Yet this right
exists only if one's protective conduct is "intrinsically right in terms of
its form" 7-that

is, only if one has subjectively determined that one's

use of coercion conforms with the principle of Right.8s If one's actions will affect other persons' external exercise of their freedom,
those actions must conform to those others' rights-that is, they must
[Governments may seek] to promote justice-related virtues by requiring patterns of conduct which should habituate its subjects to the acts of these virtues, [but] the law cannot rightly demand that people acquire, or be
motivated by, these virtuous states of character or disposition. As Aquinas
reiterates, the law's requirements (though not its legitimate objectives) are
exhausted by "external" compliance.
Id. at 233-34 (citation omitted).
84 See KANT, supra note 11, at *218-20, 379-80, 396-97, 406.
85 Id- at *231; see also id. at *231-32, 239.
86 Id. at *237; see also id at *236-38, 305-06.
87 Id at *306 (parenthetical omitted).
88 See id. at *231, 253, 255-57, 306, 312.
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be consistent in their external effects with the equal absolute moral
worth of those others as free rational beings. Hence the supreme
principle of Right: "[S] o act externally that the free use of your choice
can coexist with the freedom of everyone in accordance with a universal law." 89
In the (notional) state of nature, in which there are no legal institutions, the determination of whether one's actions conform to the
principle of Right is necessarily internal and subjective. It is the unilateral, subjective nature of private Right in the state of nature that
justifies the creation of the civil society, in which the authorization to
use coercion against others is transferred (with a few exceptions for
exigent circumstances such as self-defense) from each person to public institutions, and thus becomes a matter of public Right (law). No
matter how much good faith (virtuous respect for Right) a person exercises in the state of nature in asserting her rights, she will be unilaterally imposing her will on others, who may have different subjective
concepts of Right, and thus her action will not fully conform with the
principle of Right. In order for her use of coercion in the state of
nature to be provisionally rightful, she must not only subjectively determine that her use of coercion conforms with the principle of Right,
but also be willing to enter into the civil condition, where Right is
objectively enforced through public civil authority. 90 Moreover, she
has the right to compel others with whom she might come into conflict to enter into the civil condition with her, if they are not willing to
enter voluntarily. 91
This argument applies, inter alia, to the appropriation or use of
external resources. Through an argument by contradiction, Kant infers as a postulate of practical reason the right to acquire external
resources through first possession (in the absence of any alternative
means of original acquisition specified by law). In the state of nature,
possession of external resources is practically dependent on, and its
extent is determined by, the would-be possessor's ability to control
them by defending them against aggression by others. Yet the rightful
possession thereby acquired is provisional rather than conclusive,
since no person by his unilateral action can conclusively bind others.
Absent the universal consent of all, no one has any better right than
any other person to acquire any external resource, and the rightful
limits of acquisition cannot be conclusively established. Thus, the necessity of possession of external resources for the practical exercise of
89
90
91

Id at *231 (emphasis added).
See id. at *257, 312.
See id. at *256, 307, 312.
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freedom, coupled with the requirement that such possession conform
92
with the principle of Right, mandates entry into the civil condition.
These justifications for the existence of the state and coercive law
apply only to the potential effects of persons' actions on others' external exercise of their freedom-that is, only to matters of Right. They
do not apply to persons' internal exercise of their freedom-that is,
matters of virtue. Indeed, Kant notes, the notion of using coercion to
force individuals to be virtuous is incoherent, since virtue consists of
one's own free choice of the proper ends. 93 The external coercion of
law can only affect the external aspect of the exercise of freedom.
The internal (ethical or virtuous) aspect of the exercise of freedoma person's freely choosing her ends-cannot be coerced by another.
Although a person may be coerced into behaving externally so as to
further or hinder some end, she cannot be coerced into (freely)
adopting or rejecting that end as her own. 94
Once a person's attainment of virtue is rejected as a proper (or
indeed feasible) subject of law, the wide sense of 'Justice" as complete
virtue in our relations with others is fatally undermined. Aristotle derived (invented?) the wide sense of 'Justice" by combining the linguistic association of the just and the lawful with the assumption that law
properly encompasses all of morality. His derivation fails once the
latter assumption is abandoned. No wonder, then, that this wide
95
sense of 'Justice" is, as Finnis states, "now forgotten."
Yet, despite their abandonment of its crucial presuppositionthat virtue is properly subject to legal regulation-Aquinas and Finnis
retain Aristotle's wide sense of 'Justice" as complete virtue. Aquinas
usually calls it "legal justice,"9 6 which is especially confusing since the
phrase literally implies (and was used by Aristotle to reference) 97 the
positive law of the community, yet Aquinas has abandoned Aristotle's
assumption that virtue is a proper subject for law. To avoid this bla92

See id at *246-47, 250-53, 255-57, 261-69, 312. Finnis, noting that Aquinas

fhils to provide any explicit argument for the existence of coercive law, supplies an
argument which parallels Kant's. See FINNIs, supra note 4, at 242, 247-51; see also infra

text accompanying note 119.
93 See KANT, supra note 11, at *379-81.
94

See id. at *219-20, 239, 381. The supreme principle of virtue is, "Act in accor-

dance with a maxim of ends that it can be a universal law for everyone to have." Id at
*395.
95 Fnmms, supra note 4, at 118.
96 FrNNIs, supra note 4, at 130 n.e, 215-16 n.a; see also FiNNIs, supra note 3, at
193-94 n.VII.2.
97 See supra text accompanying notes 66-69.
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tant incongruity, Finnis uses the phrase "general justice."9 8 He acknowledges that this revised concept of "general justice," having been
severed from law, "transcends" Aristotle's conception, in which justice
is limited to what is positive law or properly subject to being positive
law.99 Thus, in his discussion of the three elements that delimit the
concept of justice, 0 0 Finnis treats the element of "lawfulness" as
merely meaning "conforming to standard" or to any moral duty, regardless of whether it is a duty that is properly subject to enforcement
through law.' 0 1
Finnis's discussions of "general justice" muddy the water even further. Although he usually emphasizes the element of "other directedness" (interpersonal relations),102 he sometimes even dispenses with
this element, apparently to enable the concept of "general justice" as
complete virtue to encompass duties to oneself as well as to others.' 0 3
More significantly, he argues that Aristotle's distinction between 'justice" as complete virtue ("general justice") and justice as a specific
("particular") virtue-behaving equitably (rather than "graspingly")
with respect to claims to instrumental goods-is "fragile" and "elusive," 10 4 and he treats the forms or principles of "particular" justice as
being (also or instead) the forms or "concrete" specifications of "general justice." 10 5 He does not explain how these forms or specifications, which are thought to provide the basic structure and content of
law, can be forms or specifications of "general justice," which, being
complete virtue, is not a proper subject of law.
Finnis's merging of "general justice" and "particular" justice may
be due to his recognition that vices other than the vice of being
98

FINNIs,

supra note 4, at 118-19, 130 n.e, 216 n.a; FiNNis, supra note 3, at

164-65, 193-94 n.VII.2.
99 See Fin'is, supra note 3, at 194 n.VII.2.
100
101

See id.at 161-64; cf.supra text accompanying note 63.
See FINNIs, supra note 3, at 164-65; see also FiNNis, supra note 4, at 216 n.a.

102 FiNNis, supra note 4, at 188; see FINNIS, supra note 3, at 161, 164.
103 See FINNis, supranote 4, at 118 ("This willingness to treat common good... as
the point of one's actions as they bear on individuals (including oneself) is called

'general justice.'"). Finnis comments,

One has no rights vis-d-vis oneself, and in that strict sense no "duties to one-

self" and cannot do oneself a wrong {iniuria} or injustice ....But many of
the responsibilities entailed by the good of practical reasonableness concern
conduct which has no direct relationship to others (and in an extended
sense ofjustice one's duties to oneself-e.g. of cleanliness and, more important, of regulating oneself by reason's rule... -are duties of "justice".. .).
IMt at 138 n.30.
104 Id. at 215-17 n.a.
105 Id. at 133; Fn,ris, supra note 3, at 166, 169 n.10, 171, 304.
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"grasping-for example, cowardice, laziness, drunkenness, and
lust-may "implicate one in [particular] injustice" by causing acts or
situations that are deemed unjust. 10 6 However, appreciation of this
point should lead one not to a more inclusive conception of "justicerelated" virtues that are the proper subjects of law, but rather to an
understanding that "particular" justice is a matter of objective Right
rather than subjective virtue.
Aristotle himself, who initially discusses "particular" justice as a
virtue, subsequently observes that a person may not have the vice of
being unjust ("grasping") and yet perform acts which are unjust or,
even without acting unjustly, be responsible for unjust holdings or injuries. 10 7 Similarly, Finnis states,
Although Aquinas' main discussion of right(s) is in the context of
justice considered as a virtue . . .he makes it clear that justice's

primary demand is that the relevant "external acts" be done; they
need not be done out of respect for justice, or as a manifestation or
result of good character. So: the good ofjustice {bonum iustitiae}
is not the "clean hands" (better: clean heart) of those who are to do
justice but rather-what Aquinas puts at the head of his treatise on
justice-justice's very object: the right(s) of
the human person enti08
1
tled to the equal treatmentwe call justice.

The distinction between the objective nature of justice or Right
and the subjective nature of virtue is emphasized repeatedly by Kant.
The external exercise of freedom, which is the focus of the doctrine of
Right (justice), depends on sufficient access to instrumental goods
and sufficient security against interferences by others with one's instrumental goods and one's bodily security. The security of one's person and property would be ephemeral if they were only protected
against those who act with a vicious (grasping) motivation or disposition. Assessments of virtue or vice (moral blame or merit) take into
account a person's subjective capacity and effort in attempting to ascertain and satisfy the objective moral duties that are derived from the
supreme principle of morality (the categorical imperative). If one's
rights in one's person and property turn on the subjective physical
and mental capacities of others with whom one (usually unpredictably) interacts, those "rights" are nominal and worthless. Rather, one
must be secured not merely against vicious conduct by others, but also
against objectively specifiable conduct by others which, if generally al106 F'nNas, supra note 3, at 164-65; see also FINNIs, supranote 4, at 224-25, 232-33;
Bernard Williams, JusticeAs a Virtue, in AiTisroE's ETHICS, supra note 32, at 189.
107 See AR sroT , supra note 26, bk. 5, ch. 6, at 1134a16-a23; see also id. bk. 3, ch.
1; id. bk. 3, ch. 5; id. bk. 5, chs. 8-9; Wright, supra note 77, at 695-700.
108 FnNs, supra note 4, at 137-38; see also id at 187-88, 232-34.
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lowed to occur without any recourse by those adversely affected,
would (contrary to the supreme principle of Right) reduce rather
than enlarge everyone's equal external freedom. Thus, as Kant repeatedly emphasizes, an action's legality (moral Rightness) is judged
by its external conformity with the objective requirements of the relevant moral duty, while its morality (virtuous or vicious character) is
judged by the actor's internal subjective capacity and efforts to ascertain and conform her conduct to those objective requirements. 10 9
So justice in its central sense is neither complete virtue ("general
justice") nor the specific ("particular") virtue of acting with an "equal"
(non-grasping) disposition in one's relations with others that involve
those others' instrumental goods. It continues to be describable as
(a) equality (b) in interpersonal relations (c) that are properly subject
to regulation through legal rights and duties. However, we can now
add two important details to this description. First, the only interpersonal relations that are properly subject to regulation through law are
those that are the focus of Aristotle's "particular" justice: those relations with others that affect those others' external exercise of their
equal freedom, by affecting their access to instrumental goods and the
security of their instrumental goods and their person. Second, the
relevant notion of equality is not a virtuous "equal" (non-grasping)
disposition in one's actions, but rather conformity with some objective
criterion of equality, yet to be specified, that implements each per109

See KANT, supra note 11, at *214, 218-32, 312, 382 n.*, 379-80, 381-83 & n.*,

389-94, 401, 404-05, 446-47, 463. Compare Kant's account with that of Oliver Wendell Holmes:
The standards of the law are standards of general application. The law takes
no account of the infinite varieties of temperament, intellect, and education
which make the internal character of a given act so different in different
men. It does not attempt to see men as God sees them, for more than one

sufficient reason. In the first place, the impossibility of nicely measuring a
man's powers and limitations is far clearer than that of ascertaining his
knowledge of law, which has been thought to account for what is called the
presumption that every man knows the law. But a more satisfactory explanation is, that, when men live in society, a certain average of conduct, a sacrifice of individual peculiarities going beyond a certain point, is necessary to
the general welfare [common good]. If, for instance, a man is born hasty
and awkward, is always having accidents and hurting himself or his neighbors, no doubt his congenital defects will be allowed for in the courts of
Heaven, but his slips are no less troublesome to his neighbors than if they
sprang from guilty neglect. His neighbors accordingly require him, at his
proper peril, to come up to their standard, and the courts which they establish decline to take his personal equation into account.
OLIVER W. HOLMES, ThE COMMON LAW 86-87 (Mark De Wolfe Howe ed., Harvard
Univ. Press 1963) (1881).
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son's Right to equal external freedom. The specification of that criterion, which differs for the two distinct types of substantive justice, is
the topic of the next Part of this Article.
IV. THE Two KNms OiF

SUBSTANTIVE JusTIcE: DISTRIBUTVE JUSTICE

AND INTERACrIVE JUSTICE"

0

Aristotle identifies two distinct kinds of "particular" justice, distributive justice and "corrective" or "rectificatory" justice, which ever
since his initial elaboration have generally been recognized as the two
basic types or "forms" of substantive justice:
Of particular justice and that which is just in the corresponding
sense, one kind [distributive justice] is that which is manifested in
distributions of honour or money or the other things that fall to be
divided among those who have a share in the constitution [civil society] . . . ,and another kind [corrective or rectificatoryjustice] is that
which plays a rectifying part in transactions. Of [the latter kind]
there are two divisions: of transactions some are voluntary and
others involuntary-voluntary such transactions as sale, purchase,
usury, pledging, lending, depositing, letting ....while of the involuntary some are clandestine, such as theft, adultery, poisoning, procuring, enticement of slaves, assassination, false witness, and others
are violent, such as assault, imprisonment, murder, robbery with violence, mutilation, abuse, insult.1 1 '
As Finnis and others have noted, Aristotle's terminology once
again is not as clear and precise as one would like. First, Aristotle
includes within the second kind ofjustice both voluntary and involuntary "transactions," even though "transaction" implies (at least to modem ears) a voluntary interaction. 112 "Interaction" should be
substituted for "transaction." Second, the words "corrective" or "rectificatory" place the focus on remediation of the second kind of injustice rather than on the injustice itself. Finnis substitutes
"commutative," the term which Aquinas uses, although he acknowledges that it also has been interpreted too narrowly (as referring
solely to voluntary exchanges)." 3 The most descriptively straightforward term, which I will use, is "interactive."
110 The discussion in this Part borrows from Wright, supra note 77, and Richard
W. Wright, Right,Justice and Tort Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAw
159 (David G. Owen ed., 1992).
111 AusroTL, supra note 26, bk. 5, ch. 2, at 1130b30-1131a9.
112

See FrNis, supra note 3, at 178.

113 Id.
at 178-79. Finnis describes Aristotle's "corrective"justice as focusing solely
on remediation and as ignoring the underlying wrong or injustice that justifies the
remediation. See id.
However, Aristotle's discussions of corrective justice pay consid-
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Finnis's initial discussions of "particular" justice (which he also
refers to as the concrete specifications of "general justice") accept and
employ Aristotle's distinction between distributive justice and interactive justice.1 14 He states that "all problems ofjustice .. are intended
to find a place in one or [the] other or (under different aspects) both
of these two classes of 'particular justice.""' 5 Yet he immediately denies that these classifications have any fundamental significance, asserting that "other classifications... could be found"1 1 6 and declaring
that "[t] he distinction between distributive and commutative justice is
no more than an analytical convenience, an aid to orderly consideration of problems."" 7 Indeed, he eventually jettisons Aristotle's classifications, claiming that "[t]he effort to understand and work with
[Aristotle's] distinctions-say, between 'distributive' and 'commutative' justice]-sheds little light on the substantive issues ofjustice." "l 8
erable attention to the nature of the underlying injustice. See Wright, supra note 77,
at 691-702. As Finnis notes, Aquinas's discussions of "commutative" justice contain
similar ambiguities regarding its scope. See FINNIS, supra note 4, at 216.
114 See FINNts, supra note 4, at 133; FrNNis, supra note 3, at 166, 177-78.
115 FrNNs, supra note 3, at 166; see also id. at 169 n.10.
116 Id. at 166.
117 Id. at 179.
118 FINNs, supra note 4, at 188. One can only speculate as to what led Finnis to
this position. One possible cause may have been frustration in attempting to follow
and make coherent sense of Aristotle's loose and inconsistent terminology, which
Aquinas apparently transplanted and multiplied with even further cross-cutting classifications. See id. at 188 ("Aquinas' efforts to follow Aristotle in classifying types of
justice-its species, parts, and associated forms-yield no really clear and stable analytical pattern."); see also id. at 215-17 n.a.
Another possible cause may have been Finnis's own occasional confusion and
uncertainty in applying the two types of substantive justice, which apparently led him
to believe that almost any situation could be described in light of either or both types
of justice, making it not very worthwhile to distinguish between the two. See, e.g.,
FiNNmis, supra note 3, at 169 n.10 (treating the opportunity of exercising some form of
private ownership as "a requirement of commutative [interactive] justice in so far as,
if everyone in a community is deprived of the opportunity of private ownership, for
inadequate reasons, then each is being treated unfairly, regardless of the like treatment of the others"); id at 179 (treating "apportionment of damages where there is
contributory negligence or [apportionment] of the costs of litigation" as a "matter of
distributive justice"). Finnis writes,
[W]hether the subject-matter of his act of adjudication be a problem of distributive or commutative justice, the act of adjudication itself is always matter
for distributive justice [f] or the submission of an issue to the judge itself
creates a kind of common subject-matter, the lis inter partes, which must be
allocated between parties, the gain of one party being the loss of the other.
Id; see also id. (describing ajudge's "duty to apply the relevant legal rules... [as] one
of commutative justice"); id. at 182 (treating the foreseeability limitations and frustration doctrines in contract law as matters of distributive justice because they take into
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This is a most puzzling position for Finnis to take, since he himself regularly distinguishes between the two types of problems or issues that are addressed by distributive justice and interactive justice,
respectively. Indeed, he identifies and distinguishes these two types of
problems as the fundamental justifications for the existence of the
state and coercive law:
What is it that solitary individuals, families, and groups of families
inevitably cannot do well? In what way are they inevitably "incomplete"? In their inability (1) to secure themselves well against violence (including invasion), theft, and fraud, and (2) to maintain a
fair and stable system of distributing, exploiting, and exchanging
the natural resources which, Aquinas thinks, are in reason and fairness--"naturally" (not merely "initially)-things common to all.
That is to say, individuals and families cannot well secure and maintain the elements which make up the public good of justice and
peace ....
And so their instantiation of basic goods is less secure
and full than it can be if public justice and peace are maintained by
law and other specifically political institutions and activities, in a way
that no individual or private group can appropriately undertake or
match ....
Suppose nobody was badly disposed, unjust, recalcitrant.
Would there be need for states with their governments and laws?
What is matter for public authority is matter for law: the sword
and the balance. It is matter for judgements, with often irreparable
finality of outcome, given by impartial judges representing the
princepsbefore whom all who seek justice are equal. None of us can
rightly be simultaneously prosecutor, judge, and witness. Private
persons and bodies are not equipped for judgement, especiallyjudgement according to publicly established law, and so cannot rightly
impose the irreparable measures which may be needed to restore
justice and peace. So they are incomplete, impeqfecta, and in need of
completion by the order of public justice." 19
As we have previously discussed, the sole point or purpose of law
in natural law theory is the realization, to the extent practicable, of
the common good through the implementation ofjustice-the creation and maintenance of those external conditions which are essential
for each person's external exercise of his or her equal freedom. 120 In
account the parties' mutual perceptions of the risks covered by the contract); id. at
188-90 (viewing bankruptcy law's pro-rata satisfaction of creditors' corrective justice
claims as a matter of distributive justice).
119 FrNs, supra note 4, at 247-49; see also supra text accompanying notes 86-92.
120 See supra text accompanying notes 32-36, 61-62, 86-94, 109.
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the above quote, Finnis identifies the two distinct problems faced by a
theory ofjustice: (1) providing for a fair distribution among the members of society of the instrumental goods which are necessary or useful
for persons' exercise of their external freedom and (2) assuring sufficient security of individuals' persons and existing stocks of instrumental goods in their interactions with others. As Finnis states elsewhere,
it is precisely these two problems that are the focus of distributive justice and interactive justice, respectively:
[T]he problems of realizing the common good through a co-ordinated ensemble of conditions for individual well-being in community can be divided into two very broad classes. First, there are
problems of distributingresources, opportunities, profits and advantages, roles and offices, responsibilities, taxes and burdens-in general, the common stock and the incidents of communal enterprise,which
do not serve the common good unless and until they are appropriated to particular individuals. The theory of distributive justice outlines the range of reasonable responses to these problems. Second,
there are all the other problems, concerning what is required for
individual well-being in community, which arise in relations and
dealings [that is, interactions] between individuals and/or groups,
where the common stock and what is required for communal enterprise are not directly in question. The range of reasonable responses to these problems is outlined in what I shall call . . . the
121
theory of commutative justice.
Immediately after supposedly abandoning the distinction between distributive justice and interactive justice, Finnis provides, in
lieu of the distinction, a list of issues which begins with the issue of
distributive justice and then continues with a (somewhat redundant)
variety of interactivejustice issues:
[Distributive justice:] Some of these issues ... concern fairness in
giving others their share of some pool of benefits or burdens involved in living in community with each other, in carrying out my
own share of such burdens and responsibilities, and in managing,
exploiting, and disposing of natural resources. [Interactivejustice:]
Some concern the wrongness of choosing to impose some harm or
loss on another or others. Some concern the wrongness of not
avoiding such imposition of harm or loss. Some concern fairness in
bargaining and exchange, especially (but not only) in recompensing others for what they lose in conferring some benefit upon one.
Some concern the requirements of fairness in compensating those
upon whom one has imposed some harm or loss without their free

121

FiNNis, supra note 3, at 166.
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and informed consent. Some concern the appropriateness of de22
nouncing and punishing offences.1
Re-characterizing the "forms" ofjustice as "issues" while focusing
on the same distinct substantive problems appears to be mere re-labeling. 2 3 The distinction between distributive justice and interactivejustice is expendable only if the problems and issues that are thought to
be governed by each are not fundamentally distinct, do not involve
significantly different criteria ofjustice or equality, and do not require
different types of legal institutions for their proper resolution. None
of these conditions are satisfied.
As Finnis's own discussions make clear, the problems and issues
that are the focus of distributive justice are fundamentally distinct
from the problems and issues that are the focus of interactive justice.
The two divisions of substantive justice deal with the two different aspects of external freedom.
Equal Freedom

External:Justice (Law)

Positive (Needs)
Distributive Justice

Internal: Virtue

Negative (Security)
Interactive Justice

Distributive justice defines the scope of persons' positivefreedomtheir access to the resources needed to go about their lives. Interactive justice defines the scope of persons' negativefreedom-the security
of their persons and of their existing stocks of resources in interactions with others. Together, distributive justice and interactive justice
seek to assure the attainment of the common good (the realization, to
the extent practicable, of each person's humanity) by providing each
person with her fair share of the social stock of instrumental goods
(distributive justice) and by securing her person and her existing
stock of instrumental goods from interactions with others that are inconsistent with her status as a rational being with equal, absolute
moral worth (interactive justice). As Finnis succinctly states, "General
justice can be specified into the forms of particularjustice, primarily
fairness in the distribution of the benefits and burdens of social life,
122 FINNIs, supra note 4, at 188.
123 Finnis's heading for the section where this re-labeling occurs is, "Justice: Forms
or Issues?" Id at 187.
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and proper respect for others {reverentia personae} in any conduct
124
that affects them."
Both distributive justice and interactive justice are based on the
same fundamental normative premise of the absolute equality of
human beings as free rational beings with equal dignity and moral
worth, who, under the supreme principle of morality, are entitled to
be treated with equal concern and respect. However, as one should
expect given the different problems and issues involved, the specification of this equality differs for the two types of substantive justice.
Aristotle uses a contrived analogy with "geometrical proportion"
and "arithmetical proportion" to contrast the different criteria of
equality in distributive justice and interactive justice, respectively. To
be distributively just, he argues, a distribution must satisfy a criterion
of equality understood in terms of a geometrical proportion-an
equality of ratios. All individuals in the political community are measured against some distributive criterion (for example, merit and/or
need), and instrumental goods (or related burdens) are allocated to
different individuals in the same proportion as their respective measurements. 125 However, when considering the justice of personal interactions, the persons involved in the interaction are considered to
be absolutely ("arithmetically") equal, no matter how unequal they
may be in terms of merit or need or any other comparative criterion:
[Rectificatory justice] has a different specific character from [distributive justice]. For the justice which distributes common possessions is always in accordance with the kind of proportion mentioned
above [geometrical proportion based on comparative measurements of merit or need, etc.].... But the justice in [interactions] is
a sort of equality indeed, and injustice a sort of inequality; not according to [geometrical] proportion, however, but according to arithmetical proportion. For it makes no difference whether a good
man has defrauded a bad man or a bad man a good one, nor
whether it is a good or a bad man that has committed adultery; the
law looks only to the distinctive character of the injury, and treats
the parties as equal, if one is in the wrong and the other is being
wronged, and if one inflicted injury and the other has received it.
Therefore, this kind of injustice being an inequality, the judge tries
to equalize it; for in the case also in which one has received and the
other has inflicted a wound, or one has slain and the other been
slain, the suffering and the action have been unequally distributed;
but the judge tries to equalize things by means of the penalty, taking
away from the gain of the assailant. For the term "gain" is applied
124
125

Id at 133.
See AmisroT,

supra note 26, bk. 5, ch. 3, at 1131a10-1131b24.
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generally to such cases, even if it be not a term appropriate to certain cases, e.g. to the person who inflicts a wound-and "loss" to the
sufferer; at all events when the suffering has been estimated, the
one is called loss and the other gain .... [C]orrectivejustice will be
the intermediate between loss and gain .... Now the judge restores

equality; it is as though there were a line divided into unequal parts;
and he took away that by which the greater segment exceeds the
half, and added it to the smaller segment. And when the whole has
been equally divided, then they say they have their own-when they
have got what is equal.... The equal is intermediate between the
greater and the lesser according to arithmetical proportion [that is,
as their arithmetic mean].... [T]o have more than one's own is
called gaining, and to have less than one's original share is called
losing, e.g. in buying and selling and in all other matters in which
the law has left people free to make their own terms; but when they
get neither more nor less but just what belongs to themselves, they
say that they have their own and that they neither lose nor gain.' 26
Analogizing corrective (interactive) justice to "arithmetical proportion" facilitates a simple, formal contrast to distributive justice as
"geometrical proportion." But it does so at a substantial cost in clarity,
and it depends on simplifying assumptions that deprive it of descriptive validity. For heuristic purposes (to allow the analogy to arithmetical proportion), Aristotle in the quoted passage treats any interaction
that results in an unjust loss as notionally involving both unjust gain
and unjust loss, with the unjust gain being equal to the unjust loss.
Then, since the parties' pre-interaction holdings are also presumed to
be equal, the judge restores those pre-interaction holdings by applying an arithmetic mean (average) to their post-interaction holdings.127 Aristotle himself indicates that his analogy to arithmetical
proportion and its underlying assumption of an unjust gain equal to
the unjust loss should be read only as a metaphorical heuristic device.
Note, for example, in the quoted passage, his caveat about the general
applicability of the term "gain" and his "as though" qualification to
the discussion of corrective justice in terms of arithmetical proportion. Immediately afterward, he moves from the heuristic, which relies on the presumed equality of both the pre-interaction holdings
126 Id. bk. 5, ch. 4, at 1131b26-1132b18.
127 For example, let A equal the parties' respective (presumed equal) pre-interaction holdings and B equal the unjust loss or (presumed equal) unjust gain. Then, the
post-interaction holdings are A+B and A-B, respectively, and the arithmetic mean (average) of the post-interaction holdings is A+B+A-B divided by two, which is A. The
arithmetic mean is implemented by taking B from the defendant and transferring it
to the plaintiff. SeeAwsToTI,

ThE NicoMAcHEAx_

ETmIcs 116 (David Ross trans., Ox-

ford Univ. Press 1984) (explaining arithmetical proportion as a heuristic device).
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and the unjust gain and loss, to the more general situation of unjust
gain or loss and concludes that corrective justice simply requires that
each person "have his own"-that any unjust loss (or gain) to his preinteraction holdings be remedied.
What, then, is the criterion of equality in interactive justice? It is
an "equality indeed," which does not employ any comparative criterion such as virtue, merit, or need. "[TIhe law looks only to the distinctive character of the injury, and treats the parties as equal, if one is
in the wrong and the other is being wronged, and if one inflicted
injury and the other has received it."128 In other words, the equality is
the absolute equality or dignity of each human being. Interactions
which cause adverse effects to another's person or property are unjust
if they are inconsistent with that person's right to equal negative freedom. Aristotle discusses many of the factors that are relevant to such
12 9
an inquiry, including intent, mistake, foreseeability, and consent.
Since distributive justice and interactive justice address quite different problems and issues and employ quite different criteria of
equality to resolve those problems and issues, it is critically important
when assessing a particular legal claim to identify it properly as either
a distributive justice claim or an interactive justice claim to make sure
that the claim is properly structured and resolved by the appropriate
legal institution, using the proper criterion of equality. 130
A distributive justice claim is a claim-based simply on one's status as a member of the relevant political community-to one's fair
share of the community's instrumental goods, including material resources and civil rights. Proper formulation and implementation of
distributive justice claims to material resources ideally require knowledge of the total amount of such resources in the community, as well
as the relative ranking of each member of the community under the
relevant distributive criterion. 3 1 All those persons who have too little
under the distributive criterion have distributive justice claims against
all those who have too much. Thus, proper implementation of distributive justice claims to material resources requires concurrent assessments against all those who have too much and disbursements to all
128

ARISTOTL,

supra note 26, bk. 5, ch. 3, at 1132a4-a6.

129 See Wright, supra note 77, at 695-702.
130 As Finnis notes, some problems may involve both types of substantive justice
issues. See supratext accompanying note 115. In such situations, it is especially important to sort out and avoid confusing the two distinct types of issues. For a brief discussion of a few such situations and further discussion of institutional considerations, see
Wright, supra note 77, at 708-10 & nn. 380-81.
131 See FNmNis, supra note 3, at 173-75 (discussing some of the relevant comparative criteria).
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those who have too little. Allowing a person who has too little to obtain part or all of his deficiency directly from another person who has
too much would not be a proper implementation of distributive justice. It would result in his being improperly preferred over all others
who have too little and in the other person's being improperly disadvantaged compared to all others who have too much. Such unequal
treatment cannot be supported as a matter of distributive justice. Indeed, his unjustified unilateral attempt to satisfy his deficiency from
the other's existing stock of resources would be a violation of correc132
tive justice.
Given the types and amount of information needed to properly
resolve distributive justice claims, as well as the ad hoc invocation of
judicial authority by litigants and the limited number of parties subject to the jurisdiction of the court in any particular legal action, the
proper administration of distributive justice claims to scarce material
resources (rather than nonscarce political resources such as voting
rights and other civil liberties) is obviously well beyond the capacity of
the courts. Only the legislature or its administrative delegee has the
institutional competence to assemble, tabulate, and (re)distribute the
material resources of society in accordance with the relevant distributive criterion.
Interactive justice has a much narrower domain than distributive
justice. An interactive justice claim is a claim by one person that another person has adversely affected the claimant's person or existing
stock of resources by behavior that is inconsistent with the claimant's
right to equal negative freedom. The injured party has a bilateral interactive justice claim against the person who injured him (and not
against anyone else) for rectification of the injury. Resolution of such
a claim does not require or permit any relative ranking of the parties
to the interaction with each other or with anyone else in terms of
virtue, wealth, general merit, or need, but rather focuses on the consistency of the defendant's conduct with the claimant's right to equal
negative freedom. (The claimant's own conduct may be evaluated on
similar grounds and compared on these narrow grounds with that of
the defendant under rules of comparative responsibility.) No community-wide tallying of resources and comparative ranking of persons are
required.
Hence, courts as well as the legislature have the capacity to implement interactive justice. Indeed, courts ordinarily would seem to be
much better suited to the task. They can more readily take into ac132 See, e.g., State v. Moe, 24 P.2d 638 (Wash. 1933); London Borough of Southwark v. Williams, 2 All E.R. 175 (CA 1971).
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count and learn from the concrete detail and variety of actual experience. If properly instituted, they are more insulated from the ebb and
flow of interest group politics. That fact plus the ad hoc and limited
nature of their jurisdiction should make them less likely than the legislature (or its administrative delegees) to confuse interactive justice
issues with distributive justice issues, utilitarian efficiency arguments,
or arguments of pure self-interest. Finally, the courts' ability, not
shared by the legislature, to focus on the details of numerous particular interactions makes them-or some administrative equivalent-indispensable to the general implementation of interactive justice.
V.

CONCLUSION

Natural law theory has employed more than its fair share of loose,
misleading, and inconsistent terminology, which prevents a comprehensive, detailed synthesis of that theory by even the most talented,
knowledgeable, and perceptive theorist. Nevertheless, over the long
history of natural law theory from Aristotle onward, there is little disagreement (at least among the major theorists) about the most basic
premises and principles of that theory as they relate to morality, justice, and law. Those principles provide a powerful and detailed basis
for the formulation, interpretation, and criticism, as appropriate, of
the positive law of any community.
John Finnis is the most talented, knowledgeable, and perceptive
natural law theorist of our time. I am at best an amateur dabbler. Yet,
it seems to me that the substantive principles of distributive justice
and interactive justice which directly and distinctly address the two
most basic problems in persons' attempting to attain the common
good are too fundamentally important, normatively and analytically,
to be cast aside. I hope I have misread Finnis as doing so. If not, I
hope he can be convinced to put them back in his natural law theory,
or that (as always) he will be gentle in showing me the error of my
ways. Regardless, I look forward to further edification by the master.

Errata
Page 878, line 6: For federal norms read federal norms that prohibit state conduct.
Page 897, footnote 152, line 9: For under law read under state law.
Page 907, line 31: For chances read chance.
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